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INTRODUCTION. This a theoretical poster. Its explores the way for a 
comprehensive understanding of the human mind. Philosophers and 
neuroscientists often reject the claim that their theory of the mind and 
of the mental phenomena is in any way ‘reductive’. This adjective 
typically involves the crucial negligence of essential features of the 
subjective and a too narrow scientific outlook. I show here that
 
by 
adequately connecting the theory of the extended mind (EM) with the 
philosophical theory of capacities or abilities, which is attributed to 
Aristotle (IV b. C.), such negligence can be avoided. A more precise, 
integrative and open-ended view of the mind emerges then, a view 
which I will only sketch here
Most capacities of the mind are described at a 
human level, not at a molecular or cellular level. 
For example, speech cannot be fully captured 
when limited to the activation of selective or 
unspecific brain areas. Speech is language, and 
this involves grammar, syntax, communication and 
human interaction at the higher of explanation 
level. In the same way we understand, e.g. that 
the mind is a capacity for thinking. Of course, 
since the capacities of the mind are interlocked 
with neural systems—albeit some capacities are 
more so than others—the description of what they 
do when on work
 
is not coincidental with the 
description of its parts. These parts are rather the 
vehicle of the operations which it does. This is why 
it is more coherent to argue with the EMT that the 
material parts are constituents of its capacity, 
rather than to argue that the capacity is part of its 
underlying parts. 
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Cognitive neural prosthetics (CNPs) are being 
currently tested to help patients with paralysis to 
successfully perform some basic tasks in a 
computer. This is a step forward which promises 
to simplify everyday life for many patients. CNPs
 
also promise to restore mobility or communication 
by way of artificial limbs and other devices. Their 
use poses a number of ethical and philosophical 
questions. For instance, if CNPs, whether organic 
or not, can be seamlessly integrated into the 
subject’s neural network and be made to work as 
neurons in everything which is relevant to tasks-
 
performance, should they be considered as an 
intrinsic part of the neural network? Could they be 
looked as a legitimate part of the SNC and hence 
be taken as part of the mind itself?
CNPs
 
link into a philosophical theory which has 
expanded the content and whereabouts of the 
mind. The extended mind theory (EMT) contends 
that the mind and its neural pathways do not 
confine to the limits of the skin-and-skull barrier, 
but extends in equal proportion to external objects 
interacting with it. Depending on the degree of 
integration of these object, they may be called to be 
part of the mind as neurons are claimed to be so. 
And so, if a patient with a neural implant is made
capable of reading and producing it 
corresponding neural waves not just to 
performing ordinary tasks with artificial limbs, but 
also to enhancing her speed in calculation, the 
neural implant, whether organic or not, should be 
credited as part of the neural system tout court. It 
should be considered true, as the EMT 
proponents hold, that epistemic action demands 
spread of epistemic credit (Clarke & Chalmers, 
1998: 8). And so if you can perform epistemic 
actions with credit without CNPs, your being 
capable of performing the very same actions 
through CNPs
 
would not only make these actions 
epistemically
 
valid, these would also imply that 
CNPs
 
have to be credited as part of the intelligent 
system, that is, of the system to which your 
mental abilities are coupled when on work.
The mind as a capacity
The extended mind theory
The mind can be seen as an exceedingly 
sophisticated capacity, the capacity to know or to 
acquire knowledge of things without altering their 
nature as they are known—by contrast to physical 
processes like burning, which by releasing energy 
enforces irreversible a physical changes in 
substances—. Aristotle explains the mind as an 
incorporeal capacity of receiving intelligible 
natural forms from the external world (429a 
13ff.) and understanding the world through 
them. Of course, although he claims that the 
intellect is ‘unmixed’(429a 18), in fact it is 
embodied in a human being which has organs. 
These organs are the seat of the perceptual 
faculties and these faculties are tightly knit to the 
mind or intellect.
The view which looks at the mind or to knowledge 
as a capacity is still in good shape (Hyman, 2006). 
Philosophers have argued that capacities can be 
defined by what they are capable of. You can then 
go on and define the intellect as a capacity for 
human abilities (Kenny, 1989:123; 2000:68). 
Capacities are different from their exercise. To melt 
is a capacity of gold. Whereas gold melts at 
1063ºC, this capacity does not necessarily imply 
that melting at 1063ºC is a constitutive part of any 
gold coin. It is surely one of its properties, but this 
capacity is not in any part of it. We do not need to 
be told about the parts of a gold coin to know that 
in normal conditions it will melt at 1063ºC; you 
might even argue that both issues seem unrelated. 
Similarly, the capacity of flying of an airplane is not 
in any or every part of the airplane, such as its 
engine or its wings. We might say that matter is 
usually the vehicle
 
of many and different 
capacities, but this vehicle is not all what there is to 
the capacity. There is always more to it.
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Capacities and vehicles go together. By their 
inseparable work on the brain and in several 
other motor or perceptive systems of the SNC, 
the mind widens its operating theatre beyond 
the scope of subjective consciousness. In this, 
externals are crucial. The EMT contends that ‘the 
external features in a coupled system play an 
ineliminable
 
role –
 
if we retain internal structure 
but change external features, behaviour may 
change completely’
 
(Clarke & Chalmers, 
1998:9). Inasfar
 
as the features of a neural 
network may be crucial to the understanding of 
the relation of that network with the environment 
through natural organs and its operations, CNPs
 
devices, no matter whether biologically foreign or 
native to the SNC, play a crucial role, for they 
boost the capacities of the mind as far as these 
capacities can get. This is coherent with the EMT 
and is precisely what CNPs
 
are designed to do: 
to allow the mind reach out to externals, as 
when, for example, your hands manipulate an 
object guided by your intellect. 
Capacities and reductivism
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EMT is best understood when the capacities of 
the mind are seen as capable of operating with 
non-biological vehicles without being necessarily 
reduced to such vehicles. In this way the mind 
appears as higher in degree and outcome to other 
systems, particularly, those belonging to the 
underlying layers of reality. And so, my suggestion 
is that the capacity theory is a valid complement 
of EMT and that together, they pave the way for a 
richer and integrative view of the mind itself, 
eschewing so strong reductivism.
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